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THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE
Testing a Theory of Scientific Revolutions
With a Formal Model
John D. Sterman
ABSTRACT
Modern theories of science emphasize scientific revolutions rather
than the traditional cumulative view of scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn, in
particular, has formulated a theory of science based on the lifecycle of
paradigms. Though Kuhn's theory is attractive, no calculus is offered by which
the theory can be tested. This study tests the dynamic consistency of Kuhn's
theory by formalizing the theory and testing it with a computer simulation
model. The model plays the roles of the actors, tracing out the consequences
of their day-to-day actions. Sensitivity tests are used to explore the
importance of various hypotheses. Results show the theory to be dynamically
consistent: the lifecycle of paradigms described by Kuhn can be accounted for
by Kuhn's theory. Kuhn's theory thus passes a test to which few other
theories of science have been subjected. The study sows how modeling can
provide a method for testing theories even when those theories are stated
entirely in qualitative terms, at a high level of abstraction, and in a




THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE:
Testing a Theory of Scientific Revolutions
with a Formal Model
...it is the customary fate of new truths to begin
as heresies and end as superstitions....
Huxley [I]
A New View of Science
~-3Weat years have witnessed a dramatic upheaval in the philosophy of
science. The old notion that science is a logical, rational enterprise contin-
ually adding to the stockpile of knowledge has been challenged; many now
recognize that the evolution of science is punctuated by violent disruptions.
During such crises, or scientific revolutions, a tried and true theory is
abandoned for an untested and often heretical alternative. Rather than build-
ing upon the old theory, the new theory destroys the old. Though the success-
or may flourish for centuries, eventually another crisis develops and another
revolution occurs. Some even claim science is completely anarchic, more a
no-holds-barred brawl than a calm, reasoned investigation of reality.
Yet the new view of science does not mean it is random. Indeed, the
proponents of the new view, notably Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific
Revolutions [7], argue that scientific development is shaped and guided by an
internal logic and structure. Forced to reject the traditional cumulative
view of scientific progress through historical analysis, Kuhn identifies a
recurrent pattern of scientific development culminating in revolution. To
explain the pattern of dynamics he establishes, Kuhn proposes a theory rooted
in the day-to-day practice of science. Kuhn's theory constitutes a dynamic
hypothesis of scientific revolutions, that is, it consists of causal hypo-
theses about the way scientists actually work, which, Kuhn asserts, interact
with nature and society to produce the dynamic pattern of scientific revolu-
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tions. Kuhn's emphasis on the uncertain, messy, and personal character of
actual scientific endeavor lends his theory great appeal. Yet, even if one
accepts the dynamic hypothesis, Kuhn offers no method to check whether or not
the theory he proposes can-actually produce the behavior he seeks to explain.
In the absence of a calculus to deduce the consequences of Kuhn's assumptions,
the chief arena for debate over the theory has been historical interpretation
3and philosophical analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to test the dynamic consistency of
Kuhn's theory in another manner, by formalizing it and then testing the formal-
ized theory with a computer simulation model. Like Kuhn's work, the model
constitutes a theory of scientific revolutions, and consists of hypotheses
about the ordinary business of doing science. The purpose of the model is
simply to play the roles of the actors in the system and trace out the conse-
quences of their actions over time, thus providing a test of the theory by




The classic examples of scientific revolution are the Copernican and
relativistic/quantum revolutions. It is widely recognized that these events
signalled profound shifts in human understanding of nature. At the same time,
revolutions were thought to be rare, marking the transition from superstition
to science, from myth to method. But the history of science does not sit well
with this view. Kuhn points out the dilemma facing historians of science:
The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic
chemistry, or caloric thermo-dynamics, the more certain they feel that
those once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less
scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncracy than those
current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths,
then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for
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the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If,
on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has
included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold
today. [10]
Kuhn resolves the dilemma by recognizing the scientific revolution as a basic
feature of science. He argues that new theories tend to replace old ones
rather than building upon them. New theories are usually incompatible with
the old, built on different metaphysical foundations, relying on different
observations, research methods, and criteria for validity. These and other
characteristics of a scientific school define what Kuhn calls a paradigm. The
concept of paradigms is central to Kuhn's analysis. It is rich in meaning and
nuance, and several key senses need to be distinguished.5
Paradigms are specific works that define a field. They are accepted
examples of actual scientific practice--examples which include law,
theory, application, and instrumentation together--[they! provide
models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific
research. [12]
Thus Newton's Principia and Keynes's General Theory are paradigms.
Paradigms define the nature of a particular science. They provide the
tools, methods, and examples that guide practitioners in their research:
Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time
discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of
various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental
applications. These are the community's paradigms, revealed in its
textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By studying them and by
practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn
their trade. [13]
The history of science is the history of the rise and fall of such
communities. The great diversity of these cultures, from phlogistic chemistry
to neoclassical economics, suggests the forces behind the growth and decline
are independent of the particular beliefs, people, and methods that make them
up. A credible theory should identify a set of generic forces, the underlying
structure responsible for the pattern of behavior common to all paradigms.
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But what exactly is this common pattern of behavior? One element has
already been identified: the growth and decline in membership. A new para-
digm emerges with the work of a single, or at most several, persons. If
successful, the paradigm attracts practitioners away from other schools.
Growth ceases when nearly all the practitioners in a given field embrace the
paradigm, for example, when 'physicist' came to mean 'Newtonian'. Dominance
may be long- or short-lived. Eventually, however, the paradigm starts to fail
(in a special sense discussed below) and loses members to new theories. Often
recruitment ceases as young scientists are drawn into a competing school and
the paradigm simply dies away.
The character of scientific activity also changes over the lifecycle
of growth and decline. New paradigms are largely untested--often the proper
way to apply a theory is unclear at first even to its creators. The result is
conflict over the fundamentals and disagreements over the facts, slowing pro-
gress. When one paradigm gains the upper hand, however, the character of
'research changes rapidly. Kuhn recounts the history of electrical research to
6illustrate the process. At first, there was no guiding paradigm and confu-
sion reigned. No one could agree on which facts were important or even what
the facts were. After years, of conflict, Franklin proposed a theory that
"could account...for very nearly all [the known electrical] effects and that
therefore could and did provide a subsequent generation of 'electricians' with
a common paradigm for its research." [14] The result was dramatic:
Freed from concern with any and all electrical phenomena, the united
group of electricians could pursue selected phenomena in far more
detail, designing much special equipment for the task and employing it
more stubbornly and systematically than electricians had ever done
before. Both fact collection and theory articulation became highly
directed activities. [153
Conflict and confusion gave way to purposeful, efficient activity. Kuhn calls
such activity normal science.
6
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Normal science is puzzle solving. It is the extension and explora-
tion of a paradigm. The dynamic feature of interest is the cumulative nature
of puzzle solving within a given paradigm. Scientists try to build upon the
foundation the paradigm work laid out and force nature into line with a para-
digm, not elicit new and unusual phenomena from her. But new and unusual
phenomena do arise. As normal science progresses, results are obtained that
do not fit into the range of expectations determined by the paradigm. Kuhn
terms such novelties anomalies. Anomalies are not simply disagreements bet-
ween fact and theory, for these occur constantly. Indeed, one of the tasks of
normal science is to bring fact and theory into ever closer agreement (and
often this is accomplished more by adjusting the facts than by refining the
theory) .7
The null result of the ichelson-Morley experiment is a particularly
famous example of anomaly. Other examples from Newtonian physics include the
photoelectric effect and ultra-violet catastrophe; modern physics is plagued
·with 'renormalization' and the seemingly never-ending growth in the ranks of
the 'elementary' particles. Again, the dynamic feature of interest is that
the progress of normal science, an activity whose aim is to suppress novelty,
produces anomalies that begin to accumulate. When the level of anomalies
reaches a certain point, the character of research changes again, entering a
phase Kuhn calls crisis.
Crisis develops when scientists begin to lose faith in the paradigm.
Under normal science, the paradigm has priority--in a clash between reality
and expectation, the burden of proof is on reality. But as anomalies accum-
ulate, that burden slowly shifts onto the paradigm. Coming to question their
tools and methods, and unwilling to trust their paradigm-conditioned intui-
tion, scientists find themselves adrift in an ocean of confusion. Research is
7
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diluted as practitioners increasingly abandon puzzle solving to take up the
anomalies. Some even "desert science because of their inability to tolerate
crisis." [16] New theories and ad-hoc patches to the old theories are propos-
ed. The situation is much like that in electrical research before the emerg-
ence of Franklin's theory. Crisis persists until a theory emerges that can
attract enough followers and explain enough of the anomalies to become the
next paradigm. The transition is the scientific revolution.
Four stages in the lifecycle of a paradigm have been described:
emergence, normal science, crisis, and revolution. The basic pattern is
fundamental, though there are differences in timing and severity peculiar to
each case. The entire process may take a few years or a few centuries; a new
paradigm may appear rapidly or crisis may deepen for decades. Figure 1 is a
generic representation of the basic pattern. It is the reference mode, the
behavior that a theory of scientific revolutions must generate. To be
credible, a theory must produce the reference mode without relying on external
·driving forces such as the emergence, as if by magic, of a new and better
theory. Further, the theory should be a plausible representation of the way
scientists actually work. The triple requirements of reproducing the refer-
ence mode internally with a plausible behavioral structure are strong
constraints. But satisfying them is by no means sufficient to prove the
theory.' Indeed, proof is the wrong dimension for evaluation. Rather, the
goal is to illuminate the dynamics of scientific revolutions by making
explicit the connections between the ordinary business of scientific research
and the dramatic changes in our conception of the world that come out of it.
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A Model of Scientific Revolutions
The Paradigm as Metaphor
The heart of the theory presented here is the identification of the
metaphysical and epistemological facets of paradigms with metaphors. In
essence, the dynamic hypothesis is that paradigms are metaphors, and metaphors
are limited representations of reality that crack when strained, producing
anomaly and crisis. Four properties of metaphor in particular bear
elaboration.
1. Metaphor is everywhere: I.A. Richards notes, "we cannot get
through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it. [17] Nelson
Goodman echoes Richards by saying, "metaphor permeates all discourse, ordinary
and special, and we should have a hard time finding a purely literal paragraph
anywhere." [18] C.M. Turbayne goes farther by emphasizing that metaphor
permeates all of our thought as well as our language. [19] Similarly, Kuhn
stresses the priority of paradigms, speaks of analogies as the foundations of
'paradigms, and suspects that "something like a paradigm is prerequisite to
perception itself." [20]
2. Metaphor involves a "transfer of schema" from one area of
experience to another: 'Metaphor' means 'to carry across'. Consider the
metaphors 'Richard is a lion', 'the brain is a computer', or 'capitalist
economies are markets.' The characteristics of lions, computers, and markets
are transferred, via the metaphors, to Richard, the brain, and capitalist
economies. The metaphors work because the characteristics of lions, compu-
ters, and markets are well known and carry a constellation of meanings, exam-
ples, connotations, and nuances that illuminate the subjects to which they are
applied. Max Black calls this constellation a "system of associated common-
places." [21] Both ancient and modern scientific theories are grounded in
_III_I_1__^_^)I__I_ ----  ·--pl_^ -_--^-----
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metaphors drawn from common experience: consider Heraclitus's 'all is fire',
the wave model of light, and the plum-pudding model of the atom.
3. Metaphors filter reality: The image of the filter appears
constantly in discussions of metaphor, and is itself a crucial metaphor.
Because a metaphor draws upon a system of associated commonplaces, certain
relationships are highlighted while others are suppressed. Black's image is a
piece of smoked glass. Looking at the night sky through such a glass blocks
out some stars, thereby accentuating others. Stars that were not noticed
before can also be seen. The filtering power of paradigms is central to
Kuhn's theory as well: "In the absence of a paradigm...all of the facts that
could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to
seem equally relevant." [22] It is interesting that the images used to des-
cribe the operation of metaphor are so similar. Black uses smoked glass,
Turbayne uses the emerald goggles of Oz, and Kuhn mentions glasses that turn
the image of the world upside down:
...the scientist who embraces a new paradigm is like the man wearing
inverting lenses. Confronting the same constellation of objects as
before and knowing that he does so, he nevertheless finds them
transformed through and through in many of their details. [23]
The filtering aspect of metaphor is often expressed by saying
metaphors are models of reality.9
4. Metaphors define reality: In addition to organizing perception
through the transfer of schema, metaphor creates the world, or at least a part
of the world. Black notes:
It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the
metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some
similarity antecedently existing. [24]
Turbayne argues for the power of metaphor to shape the world with the history
of Cartesian mechanism, concluding:
10
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...enthralled by his own metaphor, [Descartes] mistook the mask for the
face, and consequently bequeathed to posterity more than a world view.
He bequeathed a world.... Had he [chosen a different metaphor]...we
should now be living in a different world. [25]
Kuhn attributes the same power to paradigms:
...the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when
paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new
paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places...
[They] see new and different things when looking with familiar
instruments in places they have looked before. Insofar as their only
recourse to the world is through what they see and do, we may want to
say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different
world. [26]
Parallels between metaphors and paradigms could be extended indefinit-
ely but the point is clear. The term 'metaphor' or 'extended metaphor' can be
substituted for the term 'paradigm' without doing violence to the sense of
either one.
Science, then, can be viewed as the elaboration and exploration of
metaphors. More precisely, normal science is the elaboration of metaphors.
The formulation of a theory corresponds to the initial transfer, and the exp-
'loration of the metaphor to what Kuhn calls the articulation of the paradigm.
Though a metaphor is usually inspired by a small number of similar-
ities, other connections are soon noticed. When first formulated, not all the
connections are apparent. The metaphor is unexplored. Indeed, the attraction
and power of metaphor lies in its-ability to suggest undreamt-of possibilities
that open the door to elegant or useful visions of reality. The task of
normal science is to search out these possibilities and build upon them just
as a poet constructs an image and carefully draws out the crosscurrents.
Fresh metaphors jangle and startle; they are impudent and lively,
setting the mind off in new directions and creating new insights into familiar
problems. With usage comes familiarity, and familiarity breeds contempt; soon
its filtering nature is forgotten. Metaphors qua metaphors are mortal, for
11
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"with repetition, a transferred application of a schema becomes routine, and
no longer requires or makes any allusion to its original referent. What was
novel becomes commonplace, its past is forgotten, and metaphor fades to mere
truth." [27] Similarly, newly proposed theories are often introduced explicit-
ly as models or metaphors. Kuhn cites Copernican astronomy which was intro-
duced as a convenient fiction, that is, it was convenient to treat the solar
system as if the earth travelled around the sun. Only later, as scientists
gained confidence in the theory did heliocentrism become accepted, the conve-
nient fiction transformed into scientific truth. Even today, nearly seventy
years after the introduction of general relativity, the vast majority of
people unequivocally believe in the truth of the Copernican system.
While metaphors that become commonplace live on as truth, not all
metaphors are so lucky. Metaphors are inherently limited, and if pushed too
hard will strain and crack. To consider a simple example, suppose 'man is a
wolf' is proposed as a theory of human nature. Should it become the accepted
'paradigm, the task of normal science would be to extract useful insights from
the metaphor. Statements such as 'man is fierce and engaged in constant
struggle', 'men travel in packs', and 'men have accepted leaders' might
result. Such statements could be illuminating and even contribute to the
design of governments, law, and technology. At some point, however, further
application of the metaphor would begin to yield statements like 'man has fur
and big teeth', and 'man has eyes, ears, and a nose'. Such statements either
blatantly clash with experience or are trite. They are anomalies. They arise
from the fabric of the theory itself through the normal application of puzzle
solving. The accumulation of anomalies undermines the utility and appeal of
metaphors and can send them to the grave, disgraced as falsehood.1 1
12
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The Structure of Puzzle-Solving
Capturing the complex and subtle processes of metaphor birth, explor-
ation, and death in a simulation model involves many simplifications. The
model shold be viewed more as a rough translation of the theory into formal
terms than as a definitive rendering. The major sectors of the model are
shown in Figure 2. The puzzle solving sector is shown in Figure 3. Three
categories of puzzles are distinguished. Solved puzzles and anomalies are
self-explanatory; the third category, puzzles under attack, consists of those
puzzles that are formulated and actively being attacked, but which have not
yet yielded or been recognized as anomalies. Four flows connect the different
categories. Under normal conditions, puzzles are formulated and brought under
attack as others are solved. Under conditions of collapse, however, there'may
be too many puzzles under attack for the number of practitioners remaining,
and the abandonment of puzzles will dominate. If all goes w-all, a puzzle,
once formulated and attacked, will be solved in fairly short order. Such
'puzzles flow into the class of solved puzzles via the puzzle-solving rate. If
the puzzle is recalcitrant, however, it can become recognized as an anomaly.
Anomalies can sometimes be resolved into solved puzzles. The shifting balance
between these flows determines the behavior of the system, and thus the forces
affecting them are crucial.
The determinants of the initiation and abandonment rate are straight-
forward. The number of practitioners involved in puzzle solving defines a
desired level of puzzles under attack, corresponding to the normal volume of
research in the field. When the actual number differs from the desired level,
research is initiated or abandoned to make up the difference. The number of
puzzles solved each year depends on the number under study, the fraction of
practitioners involved in sanctioned research and of those the number involved
13
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in puzzle solving, and the average difficulty of puzzles (Figure 4). Practi-
tioners within a paradigm can be involved in different types of work. The
majority will usually be involved in puzzle solving, while some will be work-
ing to resolve anomalies, and others, dissatisfied with the paradigm but
unable or unwilling to defect to another, try to come up with alternatives,
write philosophical essays, etc. Those involved in puzzle solving and anomaly
resolution make up the fraction of practitioners in paradigm-sanctioned re-
search, a function of the degree of confidence practitioners have in the
paradigm. When confidence is high, almost everyone is involved in sanctioned
research. If confidence drops, however, the number in sanctioned research
drops as practitioners lose faith in the paradigm.
Confidence is (arbitrarily) defined on a scale from zero to one. 'A
confidence level of one corresponds to absolute certainty in the truth of the
paradigm. It implies that the practitioners have so much faith in the para-
digm no experience could challenge it; no observation or result could convince
'them the paradigm was not true. Similarly, a confidence level of zero implies
absolute certainty the paradigm is false. No experience could convince them
it had anything to offer. The midway point is neutral, where practitioners
are neither leaning toward the paradigm or away from it; it is the point of
maximum doubt.
The most important determinant of the puzzle-solving rate, however,
is the average difficulty of puzzles. It is assumed that, on average, puzzles
become more difficult to solve as the number of solved puzzles grows. The
relationship between solved puzzles and difficulty captures the notion that a
metaphor gets harder and harder to explore as it is elaborated and developed.
It is the core of the dynamic hypothesis. There are several ways the
'depletion' of metaphors could have been represented. One way would be to
14
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assume that a finite number of puzzles fall in the domain of the paradigm;
when these are exhausted, further work produces nothing but anomalies.
Masterman advocates such a view:
...it is not only the case that a fully-extended paradigm, or theory,
reaches a point where further extension of it produces diminishing
returns. The situation is worse. The paradigm itself goes bad on you, if
it is stretched too far, producing conceptual inconsistency, absurdity,
misexpectation, disorder, complexity, and confusion, in exactly the same
way as a crude analogy does, if pursued too far, say, in a poem....
The property of crudeness...[means] that a paradigm must be finite in
extensibility. [30]
While Masterman's hypothesis is sufficient to cause paradigms to collapse (in
the same way that the extraction of all the oil from a well is certain to shut
it down), it is not necessary. Indeed, the notion that paradigms are finite
is an extremely strong assumption. In contrast, it is assumed here that the
puzzle-solving potential of a paradigm is infinite, but as normal science
progresses, puzzles gradually become more difficult to solve. The growth in
difficulty is gradual because practitioners attack the easy puzzles first,
'leaving the difficult ones for advances in technology or theory. Often
advances in technique and theory are required before more dirfficult puzzles
can even be formulated or recognized. In addition, successful paradigms get
applied in realms quite far from their original field just as Newtonian mechan-
ics, a theory formulated to deal with terrestial and celestial motion, came to
be applied to subatomic phenomena. The farther from home the metaphor is
applied, the more likely nature is to step outside the boundaries it
establishes.
The forces determining anomaly resolution are similar to those affect-
ing puzzle solving. The rate at which anomalies are resolved into the theory
depends on the number of practitioners in sanctioned research, the fraction of
those involved in anomaly resolution, and the average difficulty of anomalies
15
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(Figure 5). Anomalies are assumed to be relatively more difficult to solve
than puzzles, and as the difficulty of puzzles increases, the difficulty of
anomalies rises proportionately. The fraction of practitioners involved in
anomaly resolution depends on the balance between the number of anomalies and
the acceptable number. The acceptable level of anomalies is the number that
can be tolerated without losing confidence in the paradigm. The acceptable
level is not zero, for some problems always face any theory, and to lose
confidence the first time an anomaly crops up would be to abandon a theory
that may have a great deal to offer. If the number of anomalies increases,
scientists are drawn into anomaly resolution; if they are successful the
number of anomalies stabilizes or declines. Kuhn notes that practitioners are
extremely reluctant to work on anomalies. Except for a few scientists who-
thrive on tension and confusion, the vast majority prefer the relative safety
and professional rewards of puzzle solving.
Recognizing a puzzle as an anomaly requires a complex judgment.
·Anomalies are not simply experiments that run counter to expectation. There
are always disagreements between fact and theory; it is the task of normal
science to reconcile the two. Only when normal science repeatedly fails to
resolve the differences or explain some novelty does a puzzle become recog-
nized as an anomaly. Thus, in contrast to the theory that there are 'crucial
experiments' that provide potential falsifications of a theory, the view
adopted here is that there is no fundamental difference between an ordinary
unsolved puzzle and an anomaly except the length of time it has resisted
solution. 12
The longer a puzzle resists solution, the more likely it will be
recognized as an anomaly. Thus, the fraction of puzzles recognized as anoma-
lies depends on the balance between the average time required to recognize an
I
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anomaly and the average time required to solve a puzzle. When the recognition
time is high relative to the average puzzle-solving time, few anomalies will
appear since few will remain unsolved for the length of time required to
become an anomaly. When the recognition time is low relative to the average
puzzle solving time, most of the puzzles under study will be considered
anomalous before they are solved.
Anomaly recognition depends critically upon the practitioner's con-
fidence in the paradigm. If practitioners believe the paradigm is 'true',
they are more reluctant to recognize anomalies than if they are not as con-
fident, in the same way that the freshly-minted metaphor is obviously only a
metaphor but the old one is taken uncritically to be literal truth. It is not
simply a matter of knowing the paradigm is wrong and refusing to admit it..
When practitioners are highly confident of a paradigm their perceptions are so
conditioned by it that they cannot recognize or assimilate phenomena that
violate it. 13
The Role of Confidence
Confidence is the focal point of the model. Confidence influences
the way practitioners allocate their research effort, how they perceive
anomalies, and determines recruitment and defections into and out of the
paradigm. Confidence represents a constellation of attitudes and commitments.
It reflects basic beliefs about reality by capturing the extent to which
practitioners take the metaphor defining a paradigm as literal truth. In the
model, confidence responds to the progress of normal science and to the number
of anomalies, and thus is a measure of the health and vigor of a paradigm.
(Figure 6). Confidence tends to decline when anomalies exceed their accept-
able level and rises when they are below it. Confidence also declines when
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the rate of progress of normal science falls below a goal defined by the
historical number of solved puzzles modified by the expected growth of solved
puzzles.
The impact of progress and anomalies on confidence depends on the
degree of confidence itself. When confidence is very high or very low,
practitioners are relatively unwilling to change their attitudes. At the
extremes, where practitioners are absolutely certain that the paradigm is true
(or false), confidence cannot change at all, by definition. In the midrange,
where uncertainty and doubt dominate, confidence can change fairly rapidly
since practitioners have no strong reasons for accepting or rejecting the
paradigm.
The Paradigm as Community: Recruitment and Defection
At any moment in the life of a paradigm there is a group of practi-
tioners committed to it comprising some fraction of the membership in the
field. In reality, commitment is a grey area: there are degrees of training
and familiarity, there are pure researchers and pure teachers, philosophers
and technicians, and all combinations in between. These distinctions are
lumped together here. A practitioner is considered committed to the
paradigm if the paradigm is the person's primary guide to professional.
reality. Membership grows through recruitment and shrinks through defections;
the determinants of these flows are therefore the determinants of the rise and
fall of paradigms. In reality, many forces influence recruitment and defec-
tion such as demonstrated puzzle-solving ability, the presence of anomalies,
the strength of alternative theories, state attitudes toward science, the
availability of funding, etc. In the model, practitioners are assumed to
respond to the confidence of those in the paradigm relative to the confidence
18
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of outsiders in alternative paradigms (Figure 7). Confidence represents
accumulated puzzle-solving ability and the threat from anomalies; it is used
to proxy funding and attitudes. When the paradigm is more attractive than its
competitors, recruitment exceeds defections. If confidence falters, member-
ship declines as defections exceed recruitment.
The confidence of practitioners belonging to alternate paradigms is
assumed to be constant, corresponding to the assumption that there is always a
competing paradigm available and that it has an unchanging degree of confi-
dence. While clearly not true, this assumption is justified for several
reasons. Competing theories do not arise at random. They tend to be born in
the crisis phase of an existing paradigm, and are scarcer during the period of
normal science. They are part and parcel of the dynamic process. Thus, in
the emergence phase of a new paradigm, recruitment would be easier than
assumed here, since the old paradigm would be in crisis and confidenco would
be low. During normal science, alternatives would die away, and thus defec-
'tions in the early phases of the crisis would be retarded, trapping the dis-
gruntled practitioners in the dying paradigm. The ease of recruitment and the
willingness of practitioners to defect depends on the fraction of the total
number of practitioners committed to the paradigm. Recruitment gets more
difficult as membership approaches 100% since the most willing practitioners
will be recruited first, leaving those who are either strongly committed to
alternative paradigms or simply unable to make the shift. A symmetrical
relationship affects defections, reducing the willingness of remaining





There are no numerical data available on paradigms, no standard time
series for puzzles, anomalies, or confidence. There is, however, a rich store
of qualitative data, impressions, common sense, and historical episode and
anecdote. These, along with theories of metaphor and science, form the basis
for the model. But computers demand numbers, and the model does contain
precisely quantified relationships. Obviously the numbers chosen are highly
conjectural. Fortunately, the precise numbers do not seem to matter to the
overall behavior of the model. Changing parameters does, as will be seen in
the next section, change the timing of events and the particular values var-
iables take on, but the fundamental behavior of the system is invariant to
such changes. Thus the great uncertainty surrounding numerical values does
not constrain the use of formal modeling as a theory testing tool.
Testing the Theory
Figure 8 shows the reference run of the model. The overall length of
the lifecycle depends on the parameters of the model, particularly the
inherent explanatory power of the paradigm. To distinguish the different
phases of the lifecycle, the reference run corresponds to a strong paradigm
such as Newtonian physics. Thus, the simulation spans three hundred years, a
rather long lifetime for a paradigm.
The initial conditions represent a newly-emerged theory. There are
few practitioners, they have solved few puzzles, and there are no anomalies
since the theory is so young and the metaphor virtually unexplored. The
practitioners' initial degree of confidence is one-half, meaning they are in




In the first three decades of the simulation, there is a dramatic
increase in confidence. Confidence rises because anomalies are low relative
to the acceptable level and because there is a large surge of progress in
puzzle solving. Confidence is not simply responding to these pressures,
however. Progress is high and anomalies are low because confidence is rising.
Rising confidence creates the pressures that cause it to grow. Several self-
reinforcing feedback mechanisms are responsible for the rise in confidence.
Rising confidence boosts progress. Initially, only three quarters of
the practitioners' time is spent in paradigm-sanctioned research. The para-
digm is so new and shaky practitioners must spend much of their time inter-
preting their results from the new vantage the paradigm affords, just as the
early quantum physicists spent years trying to understand the implications of
the uncertainty principle. As confidence begins to rise the doubts and con-
fusion- of the practitioners wane, and more are drawn into sanctioned research.
Progress rises, and with it upward pressure on confidence. An increase in
·confidence is a natural reaction to a new theory that can solve some problems,
shows promise of solving many more, and has no serious strikes against it yet,
even though it is largely unfamiliar. The effect of this positive feedback
process (Figure 9) is to create a burst of progress in the paradigm's early
years, a flush of early success that spurs interest in the theory. The
process saturates when the vast majority of practitioners are involved in
sanctioned research.
Confidence continues to rise rapidly even after progress slows.
Progress is still greater than expected, exerting some upward pressure, but
most of the impetus causing confidence to grow comes from the low relative
number of anomalies. Anomalies are held down by the growth in confidence
itself (Figure 10). Rising confidence increases the anomaly recognition time
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as practitioners, increasingly familiar with and certain of the paradigm,
begin to see reality through paradigm-conditioned eyes. The result is to
suppress the appearance of anomalies even though the average difficulty of
puzzles is increasing. In turn, the small number of anomalies boosts
confidence even more.
At the end of the emergence phase practitioners are growing, confi-
dence is still rising, and solved puzzles are growing slightly. In the next
four decades, the paradigm grows from about ten percent of the total community
to virtually one hundred percent. Again, there are self-reinforcing processes
at work. As the number of practitioners grows, the number of students they
teach, articles they publish, conferences they attend, and societies they
belong to increases, further increasing the number of practitioners. A band-
wagon effect develops. At the same time, as the number of practitioners
grows, puzzle solving increases, boosting progress. Higher progress raises
confidence, and higher confidence increases recruitment even more. The effect
of this loop is to sustain progress at a level in excess of expectations
during the growth phase of the paradigm.
The positive feedback loops identified above rapidly raise confidence
and membership in the first years of the paradigm's life. In a short span,
the practitioners evolve from confusion and doubt to a high degree of faith in
the theory. Their confidence allows them to focus their activities on puzzle
solving and anomaly resolution. The paradigm has bootstrapped itself into
normal science. Between years 70 and 100 the paradigm enjoys unparalled
success. confident and unchallenged by rival theories, practitioners make
great progress in solving nature's puzzles. Anomalies increase slowly but
remain well below the acceptable level. Normal science is at its most
productive during this period.
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Yet despite the vigor of normal science, underlying conditions are
changing. Confidence, after rising rapidly during the emergence phase, starts
to level off during the period of normal science. Because doubt and confusion
are not particularly pleasant states, practitioners responded quickly to the
early successes of the paradigm. Further increases in confidence, however,
corresponding to a shift from strong commitment to religious zeal, are slower
in coming. More importantly, the pressures causing confidence to rise in the
first place diminish, particularly because the relative number of anomalies
rises, Anomalies rise despite a gradual shift of practitioners away from
puzzle solving into anomaly resolution. The rise is due to the gradual
inc'rease in the difficulty of puzzles that comes with the growth of solved
puzzles. Higher average difficulty implies more puzzles will be recognized as
anomalies before they are incorporated into the theory. In about the 11Oth
yeai- thee number f anomali-s irises pr"ipitu-zly, and ~th effect of anomalies
on confidence soon becomes negative for the first time. Over the next decades
,there is a gradual erosion of confidence as the number of anomalies continues
to grow, but because confidence is so great, the anomalies initially make
little impression.
The paradigm then enters the crisis phase. As crisis develops, the
same self-reinforcing mechanisms that caused confidence and membership to grow
so rapidly now work in the opposite direction. As anomalies rise, the frac-
tion of practitioners engaged in puzzle solving declines, reducing the rate of
progress and eroding confidence. The process becomes a vicious circle in
which lower confidence reduces progress, accelerating the decline in confi-
dence and causing still more people to abandon puzzle solving. Increasing
doubt soon lowers the anomaly recognition time. The practitioners increasing-
ly adopt the view that their theory is a limited representation of reality,
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just as the early practitioners did, and with this recognition comes growing
awareness of the holes and rough edges where nature does not go along with the
paradigm. Even more anomalies are recognized and confidence is challenged
further. In addition, as confidence declines, practitioners lose the dogmatic
rigidity they acquired in the period of normal science. As doubts mount,
confidence becomes more volatile and responds faster and faster to rising
anomalies and inadequate progress.
After one hundred and eighty years, crisis has deepened and accelerat-
ed. Confidence is falling at an increasing rate, but only a few practitioners
have abandoned sanctioned research and still fewer have left the paradigm
altogether. It is interesting that there is a lag of about fifty years (out
of a 280 year lifecycle, or more than one sixth the lifetime of the paradigm)
between the beginning of the decline in confidence and the beginning of the
decline in membership. The model is likely to underestimate the length of
this lag since it assumes alternative theories of neutral confidence are
always available, while in reality new theories would have to evolve as the
crisis developed.
In the next sixty years, crisis becomes revolution. Confidence falls
from over three-quarters to about one-quarter, corresponding to a shift from
fairly strong belief in the truth of the theory to an equally strong convic-
tion it must be false. Puzzle solving nearly ceases. The fraction of prac-
titioners committed to the paradigm falls from near total dominance to less
than half the field. At the end of three centuries the paradigm is essential-
ly dead. Confidence is nearly zero--the paradigm is now viewed as error and
superstition. Membership is approaching zero, still lagging behind confidence
as a few extremely committed practitioners hang on despite powerful pressure
to abandon the paradigm. Such practitioners, like astrologers, would no
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longer be viewed as scientists by the practitioners of the new paradigm.
In order to test the fundamental hypothesis that it is the gradual
exhaustion of the paradigm's root metaphor that causes the revolution, a
simulation was performed in which the average difficulty of puzzles was held
constant (Figure 11). The first sixty years appear. similar to the base case:
confidence increases rapidly as there is an initial burst of progress and a
low level of anomalies. The level of anomalies increases slightly, but soon
stabilizes far below the acceptable level. The number of practitioners rises
to one hundred percent of the field, and there is steady growth in solved
puzzles. Without the gradual increase of puzzle difficulty anomalies do not
increase and confidence rises indefinitely. Normal science continues forever
and the paradigm comes to be regarded as absolute truth.
In a second test, the impact of confidence on anomaly recognition was
eliminated. . w tf. zitive -- ' th.at zupprssed ancmalies in the two
previous runs is severed; rising familiarity and confidence no longer condi.
·tion practitioners to 'see' what the paradigm suggests they should see. The
result (Figure 12) is striking in that the overall behavior is similar to that
of the base run. The major difference is one of timing--the lifecycle is much
shorter. Confidence does not increase as high as before, and membership
falters before reaching 100%. The test suggests that the degree to which a
paradigm conditions a practitioner's perception of reality is not essential in
causing revolutions. It does seem to be important, however, in determining
the effectiveness of research. Without the suppresive effect of confidence on
anomaly recognition, the number of anomalies increases much more rapidly than
in the base run, causing confidence to peak and decline just as normal science
gets underway. Interestingly, the growth and decline of practitioners still





The lifecycle plays out in about 130 years, compared to 280 in the
base case. Thus, it could be argued that the overall rate of progress of
science could be enhanced if practitioners did not tend to become rigid in
their expectations and perceptions as science progresses, certainly an appeal-
ing hypothesis. However, after 46% as much time, the paradigm has produced
only 31% as many solved puzzles, a reduction in productivity of one third.
The explanation for the reduced productivity lies in the emergence and crisis
phases. In both Figure 11 and the base run, emergence and crisis require
approximately the same length of time. The major difference between the two
simulations is the drastic reduction in the period of normal science when
anomaly recognition is divorced from confidence.
When the anomaly recognition time remains low, practitioners are 'more
open to novelty and less bound by traditional ways of seeing, so new theories
arise more readily. At the same time, the old theories, because practitioners
never achieve the narrow focus normal science depends on, do not probe as
deeply into nature as they might. The behavior of the model lends support to
Kuhn's statement that "resistance to change has a use":
By ensuring that the paradigm will not be too easily urrendered,
resistance guarantees that scientists will not be lightly distracted
and that the anomalies that lead to paradigm change will penetrate
existing knowledge to the core. [32]
Sensitivity Tests
To test the sensitivity of these results to the particular numerical
assumptions of the model, numerous simulations were performed in which virtual-
ly all parameters were varied, typically by factors of 2 or more (the tests
are summarized in Table ). None of the tests changed the fundamental behav-
ior of the lifecycle. Rather, the timing of the lifecycle, particularly the
duration of normal science, was primarily affected. Often a change had much
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less impact than might be expected. To illustrate, the paradigm-defining
metaphor was assumed to be fully twice as strong as in the base case, but th-e-
life of the paradigm was prolonged only 165 years, or by 59%. Though normal
science lasts twice as long as in the base case, the emergence and crisis
phases require the same length of time, reducing the impact of the assumed
change on the timing of the lifecycle.
As a further illustration of the insensitivity of the lifecycle to
assumptions, a fourfold increase in the acceptable number of anomalies pro-
longs the lifecycle by 23% and increases the number of solved puzzles by less
than 20%. Because practitioners are more tolerant of anomalies, fewer abandon
puzzle solving to work on the anomalies, both reducing the rate at which
anomalies are solved and increasing the rate of puzzle solving (and hence the
increase in puzzle difficulty that leads to anomalies). As a result, anomal-
ies accumulate faster than in the base case, offsetting to some degree the
effect of the assumed change. The feedback structure of the system compen-
sates for the change in assumptions, reducing the impact of the change on the
timing of the lifecycle. Similar compensating mechanisms account for the
generally low sensitivity of the results to changes in other assumptions.
Conclusions
The theory presented here, as tested by the model, supports Kuhn's
theory that the lifecycle of scientific theories springs from the ordinary
activities of scientists. The lifecycle is a systematic phenomenon with
identifiable causes. These causes are feedback processes. It is not neces-
sary to invoke competition between theories or 'great men' hypotheses to
account for scientific revolutions.
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The model supports the hypothesis that the cause of revolutions is
the gradual exhaustion of the root metaphor defining a paradigm. It is not
necessary to assume metaphors are finite, only the weaker assumption that they
gradually become more difficult to apply as they are used farther from their
realm of formulation.
Sensitivity tests reveal the overall behavior of the system to be
dominated by its internal structure. Large variations in initial conditions
and parameters produce a much smaller range of variation in behavior. The
insensitivity is due to compensating feedback mechanisms deeply embedded in
the system, suggesting historical circumstance, personalities, diverse
content, and sheer luck may play a smaller role in the broad evolution of
science than is commonly thought.
At another level, since the theory is largely a representation of
Kuhn's vision of science, it shows his theory to be dynamically consistent,
that is, it shows the behavior Kuhn sets out to explain can be produced by the
'forces he postulates. And in a larger sense, the results show how formal
models can provide a calculus to test theories of social behavior even when
those theories are stated in entirely qualitative terms, at a high level of





1. The traditional view, though not homogeneous, is best represented by
Popper [2], but see also Campbell [3], Braithwaite [4], and Hempel [5].
2. Paul Feyerabend [6] is the leading advocate of anarchism in science.
3. See, e.g. Lakatos and Musgrave [8] and Kuhn [9].
4.. In the course of formalizing Kuhn's theory, certain changes in emphasis
and interpretation are necessarily introduced. In particular, the
identification of paradigms and metaphors is not an explicit part of
Kuhn's theory.
5. Masterman [11] lists 21 distinct senses of the term 'paradigm' in Kuhn
[7], and divides these into three main categories: metaphysical, socio-
logical, and artifact paradigms, distinctions similar to those discussed
here.
6. Kuhn uses the example of the electricians to illustrate a science before
the emergence of its first clear paradigm. The lesson, Kuhn argues, is
the same for more mature fields, since during a crisis a science reverts
to a state much like the pre-paradigm state.
7. On the mutability of facts, see Kuhn's discussion of the chemical law of
fixed proportions (Kuhn [7], pp. 134-135).
8. "Transfer of schema" is Goodman's term (op. cit., pp. 71-80). Gilbert
Ryle call the transfer "a calculated category mistake"; Turbayne calls it
"sort crossing".
9. A complex philosophical problem is raised here: the nature of 'the
literal' or 'the true' from which models are abstracted or the falsity of
a metaphor established. The solution to this ancient problem is left to
the reader, who is encouraged to adapt the theory of metaphor to any
brand of epistemology desired. One solution consistent with the theory
of metaphor and paradigms is to assert 'reality' per se cannot be
directly perceived, that the sky must always be seen through some sort of
smoked glass. Though emerald goggles might be traded for inverting
lenses, as in a paradigm change, one cannot gaze with the naked eye on
the stuff metaphors are made of. Essentially, the view echoes Lao Tze:
"the Tao that can be spoken is not the true Tao."
10. As demonstrated by the case of Galileo, the process of building
confidence in Heliocentrism was largely one of personalities, politics,
and religion as well as the more usual techniques of data collection,
experiment, and logic. See Feyerabend, op. cit.
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11. The notion that anomalies arise from dying metaphors sheds an interesting
light on a curious aspect of science. When practitioners become
disenchanted with a paradigm, its fundamental tenets start to look like
tautologies. Poincare noted during the crisis of Newtonian mechanics
that 'F=ra' is not a law of nature but merely a definition, since any one
of the variables can only be defined in terms of the other two. [28]
Similarly, the evolutionary biologist C. H. Waddington, uset with
Neo-Darwinist theory, asserted the doctrine of differential reproduction
"in fact merely amounts to the statement that the individuals which leave
the most offspring are those which leave the most offspring. It is a
tautology." [29] The same is true of metaphors that have become trite
through overuse. Consider Gertrude Stein's famous quip, once called an
epitaph for a dead metaphor: "a rose is a rose is a rose."
12. The crucial experiment or falsificationist view is associated with Sir
Karl Popper. [2] See also Lakatos. [31]
13. As an example of paradigm-induced 'blindness', Kuhn (op. cit., pp. 62-65)
discusses the Bruner-Postman experiment in which subjects shown anomalous
playing cards (e.g. a red six of spades) were unable to identify the card
as an anomaly. Even with long exposure times, most people "immediately
fitted [the anomalous cards] to one of the conceptual categories prepared
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Figure 2. Overview of model structure
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RUN METAPHOR STRENGTH = 2*BASE
C CA=2
RUN EFFECT OF ANOMALIES ON CONFIDENCE = 2*BASE
C RDA=2
RUN RELATIVE DIFFICULTY OF ANOMALIES = 2
C AA=40
RUN ACCEPTABLE ANOMALIES = 4*BASE
C EGSP=O
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